Ⅰ. Introduction
The macroeconomic landscape of emerging market economies (EMEs) could be shaped by global business cycles, global liquidity cycles, domestic business cycles, and domestic liquidity cycles. This paper attempts to analyze the influence of global and domestic liquidity cycles, focusing on how U.S. and domestic policy rates affect macroeconomic outcomes and capital inflows in EMEs.
We analyze how growth and inflation in EMEs react to a U.S. federal funds rate hike. Considering that the U.S. policy rate had stayed at the zero lower bound for a significant period after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), we utilize a factor model to measure the policy stance even with the policy rate at its zero lower bound and derive three liquidity momenta associated with global financial cycles. The derivation and characteristics of these series are covered in Choi, Kang, Kim, and Lee (2014) , which identifies the three global liquidity momenta from a VAR with sign restrictions based on macro-financial variables of advanced economies, including the U.S. federal funds rate and monetary base. We apply a factor-augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR) model to EME panel data.
This approach allows U.S. to control the other elements of global liquidity cycles and idiosyncratic characteristics of each EME. We look into the effects on growth, inflation, capital inflows, stock prices, exchange rates, current account, domestic policy rates and foreign reserves. The empirical approach is also employed to gauge the effects of domestic policy tightening in EMEs.
Capital flows into EMEs are an important transmission channel of global liquidity cycles, as examined by Rey (2015) ; Broner, Didier, Erce and Schmulker (2013) ; Alberola, Erce and Serena (2016) ; Kim and Shin (2015); and Morgan (2011) . We analyze four components of capital inflows: bond investments, equity investments, foreign direct investments and other investments.
The second part of this paper explores how divergent EMEs' sensitivities to global liquidity cycles are associated with their economic fundamentals.
Previous studies have looked into differences in region, industrial structure or exchange rate regime to figure out the source of divergent impacts. We group data points of the panel by the level of the relevant variables, such as inflation, real GDP growth, current account or foreign reserves. Then, we evaluate the welfare loss of each group from U.S. monetary tightening and determine the fundamental that most strongly influences the welfare outcome in the event of an external shock. In addition, we carry out a counterfactual exercise to determine whether there exist any welfare gains if the EMEs with vulnerable fundamentals took the domestic shock-absorbing structures of their relatively robust counterparts.
Our three key findings are as follows. First, a U.S. interest rate hike outstrips a domestic interest rate hike on its impacts on EMEs. In particular, a one-percent increase of the federal funds rate reduces the GDP growth of EMEs by a half percent cumulatively for three years, while a one-percent increase in the domestic policy rate of EMEs on average slows down their economies by 0.16 percent. Second, All components of capital inflows to EMEs shrink in response to the U.S. policy rate hike, but only bond investments by foreigners respond significantly to EMEs' own policy rate hike. Third, high-inflation EMEs are more susceptible than low-inflation EMEs in terms of growth and inflation to tighter global liquidity. High-inflation EMEs can achieve some welfare gains if they adopt a domestic economic structure conducive to inflation stability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section Ⅱ presents the FAVAR model used in this paper, and Section Ⅲ illustrates the effects of U.S. and domestic monetary tightening. Section Ⅳ investigates the sources of fragility of EMEs, and Section V concludes.
Ⅱ. Empirical Model
This section briefly explains the empirical model used in this study. The model is introduced in the companion paper, Choi et al. (2014) , which offers the characteristics of the model in detail. We assume that there are three global liquidity momenta (  ), namely, policy-driven liquidity momentum, market-driven liquidity momentum and risk averseness momentum.
The three global liquidity momenta are retrieved from financial data (  ) of the G5 (the United States, Germany, France, Japan and the United Kingdom) using a factor model with sign restrictions. For example, policy-driven liquidity momentum is set to increase the U.S. monetary base. The underlying financial time series used in retrieving factors are policy rates, domestic credit, international claims, lending rate spreads, government bond yields, monetary base, real interest rates, stock prices, and stock volatility.
The above equation shows that underlying data   are explained by factors   and their idiosyncratic disturbances (  ), of which the covariance is  .
Factors   are assumed to be exogenous to EMEs in explaining macroeconomic and financial situation   as expressed in (2). Note that the factors have contemporaneous effects on EMEs.
The macroeconomic and financial situation of an EME is described by several variables in   : real GDP growth, inflation in consumer price index and one-period-lag factor are included in Equation (2). To recover the shock process (  ) in global liquidity momenta, an autoregressive structure with lag order one in equation (2) and (3) is chosen on the basis of the Hannan and Quinn (1979) information criterion.
An increase in the U.S. federal funds rate is applied in vector   and this in turn feeds into   . The accompanying changes in   embark the dynamic process of EMEs' domestic economies, which is expressed in equation (2). For the first step, we assume multivariate normality of   and   , as follows:
The conditional distribution   given   is also given by
Hence, given the value of   , the expected shock is
While it is not unlikely that a change in the U.S. policy rate would accompany changes in the market-driven factor and risk averseness factor, we concentrate on the effect of the policy-driven factor extracted from global liquidity.
Technically, this approach entails measuring a change in the policy-driven liquidity factor while the other two remain fixed. Using the well-known formula of conditional expectations under the assumption of multivariate normal distribution, we obtained the expected value of the policy-driven factor given , the other two factors.
We consider two scenarios of adjustment in   . The first scenario supposes a one-percentage-point hike in the federal funds rate, and the second scenario entails a one-percentage-point increase in the U.S. real interest rate in addition to the federal funds rate increase. The second scenario reflects the slow response of U.S. inflation to monetary tightening, as observed in Romer and Romer (2004) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) . The first scenario brings about a shock tantamount to 58 percent of the standard deviation of the policy-driven factor; and the shock of the second scenario corresponds to 87 percent of the standard deviation. We take the second scenario, which incorporates both the real interest rate rise and policy rate hike, as the baseline.
Since we drive factors from the financial and monetary data of five advanced countries, including the U.S., any combination of changes in underlying variables   is at our disposal for scenario exercises. We deliberately turn off concomitant changes from other advanced countries in consideration of the growing divergence in macroeconomic situations and corresponding monetary stances among leading advanced countries. We nonetheless keep the normal transmission of U.S. monetary policy to the U.S. price level intact after the GFC. In particular, we do not take into account any inflation pressures stemming from structural drifts (for example, perpetual shifts in productivity growth and demography) that would ultimately alter real interest rates.
Ⅲ. EME Responses to U.S. and Domestic Monetary Tightening monetary shock on other countries. Although its approach to measuring the U.S. policy shock on the output of other countries differs from ours in several aspects, such as the selection of shock-receiving countries (EME vs EME and AD countries), the measure of output (real GDP vs. industrial production), and data frequency (quarterly vs monthly), we find that its results are largely consistent with ours.
As shown in the third row of Figure (2006) based upon an estimated DSGE model report a limited transmission of U.S.
monetary shocks to Europe. We will revisit this issue when discussing differentiation among EMEs.
We use data beyond the GFC, while most studies on monetary spillovers focus on periods prior to the GFC when the U.S. federal funds rate was not constrained by its zero lower bound. Two developments may have resulted in the low contagion of monetary policy from the U.S. to EMEs. The foremost cause is, of course, the federal funds rate at its zero lower bound. Although the U.S. policy rate stayed at this level for seven years, most EMEs reacted to the waves of global liquidity stemming from the vigorous unconventional monetary policy of the U.S. Federal Reserve. Second, most existing studies on monetary contagion take the U.S. as the epicenter and largely abstract out the contribution of other advanced countries, while other advanced countries also have contributed to the supply of GL. The synchronization in the supply of global liquidity among advanced countries that was witnessed prior to the GFC is at odd with recent divergences in monetary policy among advanced economies.
Our work takes a conservative position in that only the contribution of the U.S.
in the supply of global liquidity is put into the exercise while the secondary global liquidity generated from other advanced countries is turned off.
A recent study by Edwards (2015) finds relatively strong spillovers of U.S. However, we must accept that the empirical model lacks a link between EMEs and global business cycles. We employ recursive restrictions to identify the domestic monetary shock, placing variables in the following order: CPI inflation, real GDP, current account, capital inflows, foreign reserves, overnight call rates, stock prices, and nominal effective exchange rates. We place 1) While Edwards (2015) deals with a long-run policy contagion from the U.S. to some EMEs, our study focuses on the dynamic responses of EMEs to global liquidity shocks driven by G5 monetary policy. For this purpose, we draw changes in the U.S. policy rate, controlling for U.S. real GDP growth and inflation of producer prices. Edwards' estimation focuses on the long-run contagion, employing an error correction model, while we estimate short-term spillover based upon the VAR approach.
slow-moving real-sector variables ahead of variables reflecting financial flows.
We assume that monetary policymakers in EMEs set their policy rates responsively to innovations in real-sector and financial-flow data. Finally, we allow asset prices and nominal effective exchange rates to react to domestic monetary shocks. We find that it is essential to have the aforementioned sequence over the groups of variables-such as real sector, financial flows, policy measures, and asset prices-to obtain reasonable responses, but that any change in sequence within each group has little impact on the results. capital inflows, which are followed by a lagged reversal, and domestic currency appreciations in two quarters with lower inflation and current account surplus.
Stock prices drop initially but quickly rebound. Output growth, inflation, and current account at their peaks have much smaller responses to the domestic policy rate hike than to the U.S. policy rate hike.
Although 
Effects on components of capital flows
The previous section finds that global liquidity shrinkage causes overall outflows of foreign investments from EMEs. The IMF categorizes capital flows into portfolio investments, direct investments, and other investments. Portfolio investments are divided further into bond investments and equity investments.
Using IMF data, we look into whether the withdrawal of global liquidity has diverse effects across different categories of capital inflows to EMEs.
In response to tighter U.S. monetary policy, all the categories of capital inflows show different degrees of substantively weakened inflows (see dotted lines in Figure 3. 2) The most significant change in capital flows takes place in foreigners' investments in domestic bonds. Equity inflows are only marginally affected by the change in GL. Direct investments by foreigners increase initially but soon reverse to significantly negative figures.
The solid lines of Figure 3 depict how a domestic policy rate hike affects foreigners' investments in EMEs. Tighter domestic policy on average has smaller impacts on capital flows than U.S. tighter policy does, and its impacts are significant only for bond inflows. This finding suggests that adjusting policy rates in EMEs to handle capital flows could largely be ineffective.
2) Broner et al. (2013) examine the impacts of banking, currency, and debt crises on capital flow components. They find declines in capital inflows during crises across all the components for upper-middle-income and lower-middle-income countries.
Ⅳ. Divergent EME Responses to U.S. Monetary Policy Shocks

Do EME responses depend on economic fundamentals?
In the previous section, we have found that the withdrawal of global liquidity We employ a grouping approach similar to Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) . 4) An alternative method to investigate the link between country characteristics and certain statistical outcomes is regressing the outcomes on country characteristics as in Miniane et al. (2007) . A typical approach is running country-level VARs with limited lags and variables, obtaining statistical outcomes, such as impulse responses, and finally regressing the outcomes on the variables of country characteristics. This approach, however, has three drawbacks: (ⅰ) observation inaccuracy owing to limited degrees of freedom;
(ⅱ) sample uncertainty in the second-stage regression owing to treating the outcome from the first-stage analysis as a direct observation; 5) and (ⅲ) evolving
3) This method of measuring deviation for a single variable differs somewhat from the typical measurement of the loss function but retains information on the direction of responses and facilitates comparison with other studies. 4) Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) form portfolios from government bonds of sample countries such that each portfolio includes a group of government bonds with similar levels of interest rate, and bonds are dynamically assigned to each portfolio. Thus, the government bonds of a single country may belong to different portfolios over time. The behavior of low-or high-yield currencies can be directly analyzed through portfolios. 5) Miniane et al. (2007) have the exhaustive sets from the exercise.
We find that CPI inflation has discernable welfare consequences with respect to real growth, CPI inflation and exchange rates from the first column of Figure   4 . Countries that experienced high inflation for the previous three years are likely to experience more drastic output loss, higher inflation and larger depreciation than their moderately inflationary counterparts. The most inflationary group will experience a severe real depreciation in the event of global liquidity withdrawal while the least inflationary group will experience moderate real appreciation due to the deflationary effect of liquidity loss and stable exchange rates against the shock.
The real GDP growth rates of EMEs in our samples are more evenly 
Does the level of inflation matter in transmitting policy shocks?
This subsection explores divergent EME responses stemming from cross-border diversity in inflation and their welfare implications. Since the level of CPI inflation offers a clear demarcation of macroeconomic management among EME countries, we divide 19 EMEs into two groups: high-inflation and low-inflation groups. 7) The high-inflation group has seen a 14 percentage point increase per annum in their price levels during the sample period, while low-inflation group has experienced only 4 percent inflation on average. Figure 5 shows that high-inflation countries are more susceptible to a
6) The previous inflows of foreign capital are found to affect the magnitude of foreign investment reversal in response to a U.S. interest rate hike but to have little impacts on growth and inflation. This finding is odd with the concern that financial openness may be related to external vulnerability. There are two possible explanations on the matter. First, financial openness is an endogenous outcome of an economy rather than exogenously determined institutions. In an economy that is capable of manage capital inflows while gaining the benefit of them, policymakers are more likely to initiate or accelerate the process of financial liberation. Second, our measure is about the flows of capital rather than stock and the financial openness of a certain country is better proxied by stock of inbound investments. 7) The high-inflation group comprises Argentina, India, Hungary, Mexico, Indonesia, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. The low-inflation group includes the rest of the sample countries except for Brazil, which is at the mid-point among EMEs in terms of CPI inflation. The figure summarizes the responses of two EME groups after a one-percent-point increase of the U.S. federal funds rate using a panel FAVAR model for each group. The unit of the y-axis is percentage points. The shaded areas mark the confidence bands between 16% and 84% for the low-inflation group, constructed by the Bayesian Monte Carlo integration method.
In terms of output growth and inflation, low-inflation EMEs absorb the shock with a lesser swing than high-inflation EMEs, as summarized in Table 1 .
Exchange rates and stock prices exhibit little quantitative differences. The real depreciation of the high-inflation group exceeds that of low-inflation group because the former experiences much higher inflation after the first period than the latter does, while they see similar magnitudes of currency depreciation. As a result, the high-inflation group has more room for mercantile advantage over the low-inflation group, thereby reaping higher rises in the current account.
On the basis of the welfare measures we used in the previous exercise, the output loss of the high-inflation group is larger than that of low-inflation group.
Upon tighter U.S. monetary policy, the high-inflation group would have more diverse price responses with higher inflation than the low-inflation one would, as implied by the perspective of New Keynesian sticky price models. All of the welfare-relevant measures indicate that the high-inflation group fares much worse than the low-inflation group.
Counterfactual exercise: mimicking low-inflation economies?
Broadly speaking, the divergent responses of the two EME groups are attributable to EMEs' differential reactions upon the arrival of the shock and their absorbing processes afterwards. What could be the possible causes of such We employ a method used by Stock and Watson (2003) , specifically, replacing the estimate of A in equation (2) In particular, we find that high-inflation than low-inflation EMEs are more susceptible to the shock stemming from a U.S. federal funds rate hike.
8) Apart from welfare gains from the improved responses of capital inflows and exchange rates, the gain from moderate inflation may outweigh the loss from output growth. Of course, this argument depends on the weights placed on inflation and output gap in the loss function. For an open economy, the relative weights between output gap and inflation are same as those of a closed economy as in Woodford (2003) , although inflation in the loss function usually stands for inflation of domestic goods (see Corsetti, 2010) . A typical calibration of parameters results in a low weight placed on the output gap. Even if we use a higher weight on the output gap as argued by Debortoli et al. (2015) , the counterfactual outcome is still preferable to the original outcome.
